Automated web authentication probing from datacenter infrastructure. Reused ephemeral authorization ...
show moreAutomated web authentication probing from datacenter infrastructure. Reused ephemeral authorization URL, spoofed mobile browser user-agent, and tested alternate login/registration paths. No successful login observed.
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Automated web authentication probing from datacenter infrastructure. Reused ephemeral authorization ...
show moreAutomated web authentication probing from datacenter infrastructure. Reused ephemeral authorization URL, spoofed mobile browser user-agent, and tested alternate login/registration paths. No successful login observed.
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Automated web authentication probing from datacenter infrastructure. Reused ephemeral authorization ...
show moreAutomated web authentication probing from datacenter infrastructure. Reused ephemeral authorization URL, spoofed mobile browser user-agent, and tested alternate login/registration paths. No successful login observed.
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Automated reconnaissance scan detected. Nmap Scripting Engine user-agent observed with requests to ` ...
show moreAutomated reconnaissance scan detected. Nmap Scripting Engine user-agent observed with requests to `/nmaplowercheck*`, `/HNAP1`, and other probe endpoints, along with TLS and RTSP probing. Short burst (~40s), no successful interaction. Consistent with scripted service discovery.
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Automated vulnerability scanning detected against web application on port 8081.
Source used LeakI ...
show moreAutomated vulnerability scanning detected against web application on port 8081.
Source used LeakIX-style scanner (User-Agent: l9explore/1.2.2) to probe for sensitive files and misconfigurations including:
- /.env, /.env.*, /.env.backup
- /.git/config
- /docker-compose.yml, /Dockerfile
- /.vscode/sftp.json
- Path traversal attempts targeting /etc/hosts and /etc/passwd
Multiple requests observed in rapid succession indicating automated scanning behavior.
Activity consistent with reconnaissance and attempted data exfiltration.
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Automated HTTP scan for common PHP webshells and WordPress vulnerabilities. ~90 requests in ~30 seco ...
show moreAutomated HTTP scan for common PHP webshells and WordPress vulnerabilities. ~90 requests in ~30 seconds across multiple endpoints (e.g. /wp-admin, /wp-content, random *.php).
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Source IP 104.248.170.167 repeatedly attempted unauthorized SSH authentication against my server ove ...
show moreSource IP 104.248.170.167 repeatedly attempted unauthorized SSH authentication against my server over several hours.
Observed behavior:
- Repeated login attempts targeting the "root" account
- Failed password authentication
- Connection closed after each attempt
- Pattern consistent with automated SSH credential scanning
Sample logs:
Mar 07 21:05:15 Failed password for root from 104.248.170.167 port 54080 ssh2
Mar 07 21:05:15 Connection closed by authenticating user root 104.248.170.167 port 54080 [preauth]
Mar 07 21:06:46 Failed password for root from 104.248.170.167 port 44060 ssh2
Mar 07 21:06:48 Connection closed by authenticating user root 104.248.170.167 port 44060 [preauth]
All attempts failed. Only legitimate SSH access was from my own IP.
This activity persisted for multiple hours and appears to be automated credential probing.
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Observed repeated anomalous TCP connections from 45.171.31.79 to :443.
Suricata IDS recorded appr ...
show moreObserved repeated anomalous TCP connections from 45.171.31.79 to :443.
Suricata IDS recorded approximately 6317 alerts associated with malformed TCP stream behavior. Alert signatures include:
SURICATA STREAM 3way handshake SYN resend different seq on SYN recv
SURICATA STREAM 3way handshake SYNACK resend with different ack
SURICATA STREAM ESTABLISHED SYN resend with different seq
SURICATA STREAM 3way handshake wrong seq wrong ack
Traffic consisted of rapid connection attempts using many different source ports. No TLS or HTTP session was established and the source IP does not appear in nginx access or error logs, indicating connections did not progress beyond the TCP handshake stage.
Target service: TCP/443.
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Port ScanExploited Host
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