Brute-force SSH attack via Go-based client (SSH-2.0-Go). Nine sessions attempted creds against admin ...
show moreBrute-force SSH attack via Go-based client (SSH-2.0-Go). Nine sessions attempted creds against admin/root: 123456, 123qwe, 123qwerty, 21, 321, 654321, root123, root2026, welcome. All paired with sudo privilege escalation via piped passwords. Recon phase executed: nproc, /proc/cpuinfo, busybox for CPU enumeration; uname variants for kernel/system info. PATH set to standard dirs—consistent with automated toolkit. Attack pattern indicates automated botnet scanning on compromised host. No cmd execution payloads, malware dl, or persistence observed. Credential stuffing uses common weak passwords typical of dictionary brute-force. Go SSH client suggests custom scanning framework or lightweight bot for distributed campaigns. Recommend blocking. Monitor for follow-up exploitation from this source or related IP ranges if brute-force succeeds on weak systems.
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Credential stuffing attack using weak passwords (root/123456, root/123qwerty) via SSH-2.0-Go client. ...
show moreCredential stuffing attack using weak passwords (root/123456, root/123qwerty) via SSH-2.0-Go client. Attacker performed system reconnaissance: probed CPU count via multiple fallback methods (nproc, /proc/cpuinfo, busybox), gathered kernel/hostname info (uname), and manipulated PATH environment. Commands attempted sudo privilege escalation with piped credentials. No malware, persistence mechanisms, or lateral movement detected. Attack focused on fingerprinting target system capabilities—consistent with botnet reconnaissance or pre-exploitation scanning. Three sessions over 11 minutes suggests automated scanning rather than interactive shell activity.
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Systematic recon across 5 sessions using SSH-2.0-Go client. Weak creds attempted: debian/admin123, d ...
show moreSystematic recon across 5 sessions using SSH-2.0-Go client. Weak creds attempted: debian/admin123, debian/password, debian/qwerty, guest/111111, guest/123. Primary activity: CPU enumeration via nproc+sudo using discovered passwords, then grep /proc/cpuinfo. Commands executed via echo piping to sudo -S, indicating automated password-spraying. Secondary recon: PATH exports (usr/local/sbin, usr/local/bin, usr/sbin, usr/bin, sbin, bin) followed by uname for system info (kernel, hostname, arch). Attacker attempted multiple fallback paths (/bin/uname, /usr/bin/uname) suggesting heterogeneous targeting. Pattern: botnet or automated scanner profiling environment pre-payload deploy. No persistence, lateral movement, or malware dl observed. Activity stops at enumeration. Go-based SSH client suggests lightweight scanning utility or botnet scanner. 14-minute concentration with cred rotation indicates rapid enumeration typical of mass-scanning against default/weak creds. No interactive shell usage.
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tempted brute-force SSH access using three credential pairs (345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5 ...
show moretempted brute-force SSH access using three credential pairs (345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5662d34, root/Qwert123!) with libssh 0.9.6 client across 3 sessions in 6-second window. Upon gaining access, executed persistence and anti-forensics commands: (1) removed existing SSH directory, recreated it, and injected RSA public key (AAAAB3NzaC1yc2E...) for backdoor access; (2) attempted to disable file immutability flags on .ssh directory using chattr and lockr commands to prevent detection and removal. Attack chain shows standard SSH credential compromise leading directly to unauthorized key injection for persistent access. No downloads observed. Lateral movement commands not present in captured activity.
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Credential enumeration attack using Go SSH client. Attacker attempted 7 sequential logins with debia ...
show moreCredential enumeration attack using Go SSH client. Attacker attempted 7 sequential logins with debian user + incrementally longer numeric passwords: 123123, 1234, 12345, 123456, 12345678, 123456789, 1234567890. Reconnaissance cmds enumerated CPU cores via nproc, /proc/cpuinfo parsing, busybox alternatives. System info enumeration via uname (kernel, version, hostname, arch). Commands used sudo with piped password delivery, targeting sudo-privileged accounts. PATH set to standard system dirs. Attack pattern consistent with automated reconnaissance phase of botnet deployment or malware staging for vulnerable/misconfigured systems. No successful authentication or payload exec observed. 7 sessions over 14-min window indicates rapid scanning across multiple credential combinations. Go SSH client usage suggests programmatic attack framework vs manual access attempt.
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Attempted credential brute-force using libssh 0.9.6 across 3 sessions. Creds tried: 345gs5662d34/345 ...
show moreAttempted credential brute-force using libssh 0.9.6 across 3 sessions. Creds tried: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, ozone/3245gs5662d34, ozone/ozone. Post-access SSH key injection: removed .ssh dir, recreated it, injected malicious RSA pubkey (AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx) into authorized_keys. Cmd chain shows chattr use to remove immutable attrs from .ssh, followed by "lockr" utility execution with -ia flags for obfuscation. Attack reflects credential compromise + SSH backdoor install for persistent access independent of password changes.
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Brute force attack on admin acct via SSH using Go-based tool. Attacker conducted systematic resource ...
show moreBrute force attack on admin acct via SSH using Go-based tool. Attacker conducted systematic resource enumeration: CPU core count probing (nproc, /proc/cpuinfo, busybox). Password spray creds: 1234567, 12345678, 123456789, 123abc, 1q2w3e4r, abc123, admin. All nproc cmds prefixed with sudo attempts. Reconnaissance phase targeting privilege escalation/system specs. PATH variable manipulation for cmd execution context. Final cmds gathered system info via uname with fallback paths to /bin/uname, /usr/bin/uname. No successful auth, payloads, persistence, or lateral movement detected. Consistent with automated scanner testing weak creds/sudo misconfiguration on internet-facing SSH. Single IP conducted spray across 7 sessions over 12 min, suggesting reconnaissance bot targeting default/weak admin creds.
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tempted brute-force authentication using 9 credential pairs across 10 sessions within 105 seconds. G ...
show moretempted brute-force authentication using 9 credential pairs across 10 sessions within 105 seconds. Go-based SSH client indicates automated scanning tool. Credentials targeted common usernames (root, admin, ec2-user, app, user, xiao, frank, fivem) with weak or default passwords (admin!@, rootroot, 12345, eve). Two recon commands executed post-authentication: uname queries to enumerate system architecture and kernel details. No malware payloads, persistence mechanisms, or lateral movement observed. Attack pattern consistent with indiscriminate credential stuffing against exposed SSH services. No file downloads or modifications detected.
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Attack chain: Three login attempts using weak credentials (345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, ali/3245gs5662 ...
show moreAttack chain: Three login attempts using weak credentials (345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, ali/3245gs5662d34, ali/Aa@123456) via libssh 0.9.6 client. Two commands executed across two sessions. First command removes existing SSH directory, recreates it, and injects an RSA public key (AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx...) to authorized_keys for persistent SSH access. Second command disables file immutability flags on the SSH directory using chattr and lockr utilities, removing protection against deletion or modification. Attack demonstrates credential stuffing against weak/default accounts, SSH key-based persistence establishment, and defensive evasion by stripping file protection mechanisms that would prevent future tampering.
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Brute force SSH attack: 8 weak root passwords (12345678, 123456789, 1234567890, 123456a, 123456b, 12 ...
show moreBrute force SSH attack: 8 weak root passwords (12345678, 123456789, 1234567890, 123456a, 123456b, 123abc, 123qwe, 1q2w3e4r) across 8 sessions via SSH Go client. Attack pattern consistent w/ automated scanning/botnet. Reconnaissance cmds: nproc, /proc/cpuinfo, busybox to enumerate CPU cores—suggests cryptomining or distributed attack prep. Secondary cmds gathered system info (uname, hostname, architecture). Attacker manipulated PATH for cmd execution in restricted environments. Duration 13+ min w/ multiple session attempts indicates retry logic or manual persistence. Go SSH client suggests lightweight scanner or custom botnet component vs standard OpenSSH. No successful auth, malware payloads, persistence mechanisms, or lateral movement observed. Reconnaissance pattern matches initial cryptomining botnet infection stage or preparatory scanning for vulnerable systems suitable for C2 deployment.
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used credentials root/000000 across 2 sessions from Go-based SSH client. Initial reconnaissance phas ...
show moreused credentials root/000000 across 2 sessions from Go-based SSH client. Initial reconnaissance phase executed system enumeration commands: CPU core count detection via nproc, /proc/cpuinfo parsing, and busybox fallbacks; PATH variable manipulation; uname system information gathering (kernel, hostname, architecture). Commands show polyglot execution patterns with multiple fallback mechanisms (/usr/bin, /usr/local/sbin paths) suggesting targeting heterogeneous environments. Reconnaissance sequence indicates fingerprinting for botnet recruitment or payload optimization. No command completion observed in logs—session likely terminated before full execution or payload delivery. No persistence mechanisms, lateral movement, or malware downloads detected. Attack window 2m29s across both sessions. Weak credential (000000) suggests opportunistic scanning rather than targeted compromise. Go SSH client consistent with automated botnet propagation tools like Mirai variants or similar IoT-focused malware frameworks.
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Go-based SSH reconnaissance. 4 login attempts: admin/654321, admin/7777777, admin/abc123, admin/admi ...
show moreGo-based SSH reconnaissance. 4 login attempts: admin/654321, admin/7777777, admin/abc123, admin/admin. Executed automated cmd sequences enumerating CPU cores via nproc, /proc/cpuinfo parsing, busybox. Commands piped creds to sudo without password, suggesting sudo misconfiguration or priv esc testing. Gathered system info via uname with multiple execution paths across Linux distributions. PATH manipulation observed. No file dl, persistence, or lateral movement detected. Pattern consistent with botnet victim profiling/cryptominer fingerprinting phase. Purpose-built reconnaissance tool indicated by Go SSH client implementation. ~7min across 4 connections shows systematic credential testing followed by standardized profiling queries. Initial access stage preceding payload deployment.
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Credential brute-force attack targeting admin account with sequential numeric passwords (123123, 123 ...
show moreCredential brute-force attack targeting admin account with sequential numeric passwords (123123, 123321, 1234, 12345, 123456, 1234567). Six SSH sessions established using Go SSH client variant. Attack focused on system reconnaissance: CPU core enumeration via nproc fallback chain (nproc > /usr/bin/nproc > busybox nproc > /proc/cpuinfo grep), system information collection (uname -s -v -n -m), and PATH manipulation. Commands executed with sudo privilege escalation attempts using password piping. No payload delivery, file downloads, or persistence mechanisms observed. Pattern matches automated reconnaissance scanner gathering hardware specifications, likely for botnet resource profiling or mining capability assessment prior to malware deployment. Attack chain: credential brute force > auth > sudo recon commands > system fingerprinting. All attempts logged within 11-minute window suggesting single automated session with credential cycling rather than distributed scanning.
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Automated SSH brute-force attempt using Go-based SSH client. Single session successfully authenticat ...
show moreAutomated SSH brute-force attempt using Go-based SSH client. Single session successfully authenticated with root account using weak credential root/------fuck------. Attacker executed uname -s -m to enumerate system architecture details. No malware downloads, persistence mechanisms, lateral movement, or port forwarding observed. Attack pattern consistent with opportunistic credential scanning targeting default/weak credentials. Minimal reconnaissance activity suggests early-stage probe or automated scanning. No file artifacts recovered. Attack duration approximately 12 seconds across 2 total sessions.
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Weak creds (admin/admin) exploited in single session. Attacker exec'd chmod, clean.sh, setup.sh—all ...
show moreWeak creds (admin/admin) exploited in single session. Attacker exec'd chmod, clean.sh, setup.sh—all removed post-execution for anti-forensics. SSH persistence established: ~/.ssh dir created, chattr -ia on authorized_keys, RSA pubkey injected (AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCqHrvn...) for passwordless return access. Go-based SSH client indicates potential botnet/automated framework. Attack duration 40sec. No lateral movement, port forwarding, or recon observed. Clean.sh/setup.sh payloads unrecovered—likely contained malware, backdoor, or system mods. Attacker prioritized persistence over covering all traces. Dictionary attack targeting default creds.
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Brute force SSH attack using libssh library on 2026-07-20. Creds attempted: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d3 ...
show moreBrute force SSH attack using libssh library on 2026-07-20. Creds attempted: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, git/3245gs5662d34, git/Hello@123. Attacker established 3 SSH sessions in 4.5 sec. Post-auth persistence: removed .ssh dir, recreated it, injected RSA pubkey AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx into authorized_keys for backdoor access. Second cmd attempted chattr/lockr to modify file attributes, prevent key removal, harden persistence on .ssh dir. Attack demonstrates credential stuffing + SSH key injection + file attribute manipulation for anti-removal protection. Typical automated exploitation framework targeting exposed SSH services, likely wordlist-based or targeting common git accounts.
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Credential stuffing attack via libssh. Three login attempts in 5.6s: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root ...
show moreCredential stuffing attack via libssh. Three login attempts in 5.6s: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5662d34, root/Qwert789. Post-auth cmds executed: (1) Removed .ssh dir, recreated it, injected malicious RSA pubkey to authorized_keys for persistence. (2) Removed immutable attrs from .ssh using chattr -ia, then executed non-standard lockr -ia cmd (likely custom malware for privilege escalation/persistence). Attack chain shows rapid SSH key injection combined with filesystem attr manipulation to prevent removal/detection. Automated scanning and payload delivery within 5.6s window. Malware tooling (lockr) executed in-memory. Active SSH key injection paired with filesystem hardening evasion.
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Brute-ForceSSH
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