30 SSH sessions in ~15 minutes using SSH-2.0-Go. The source tried many weak credentials across commo ...
show more30 SSH sessions in ~15 minutes using SSH-2.0-Go. The source tried many weak credentials across common accounts: test, test1, test2, test3, testuser, tomcat, ubuntu, including password pairs like test/P4$w0rd, test/password, test/qwerty, test/test123, test1/123456789, test3/4321, tomcat/tomcat123, ubuntu/123456789. After login it ran 540 commands (473 unique), heavily repeating sudo-wrapped nproc checks with guessed passwords (1, 12, 123, 1234, 12345, 123456, 1234567, 12345678, 123456789, 4321), indicating automated credential testing and host enumeration. No downloads, dropped files, persistence changes, lateral movement, port forwarding, or malware artifacts were observed in this session set.
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SSH login attempts used admin/letmein and root/root over SSH-2.0-Go. After access, the actor repeate ...
show moreSSH login attempts used admin/letmein and root/root over SSH-2.0-Go. After access, the actor repeatedly tried to execute a dropped file at /home/<user>/.16, then ran chmod +x and rm -rf against it, indicating execution and cleanup attempts. The session also issued many probe/marker commands including echo 'check_2d7ec9dd4c38f9d73640745a2b06d67f_transport_done' and echo 'check_506c8a6b5d01a0b34aa6c6b7859897f1_transport_done'. Two uploads of /home/honeypot/.16 were observed. No persistence, port forwarding, lateral movement, or additional downloads were observed.
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29 SSH sessions in 14 minutes with SSH-2.0-Go. Repeated brute-force logins against common accounts: ...
show more29 SSH sessions in 14 minutes with SSH-2.0-Go. Repeated brute-force logins against common accounts: master, mysql, odoo, oracle, postgres using weak passwords like 1, 123, 1234, 123456, password, qwerty, wasd, and account-matching variants. After login attempts, the actor ran sudo with many tried passwords and issued nproc/grep /proc/cpuinfo checks to fingerprint host CPU count and test privileged command execution. No file downloads, dropped artifacts, persistence actions, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed. 458 unique commands / 522 total, focused on credential guessing and basic host recon.
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SSH login attempts used master/wasd and root/root from an SSH-2.0-Go client. After login, the actor ...
show moreSSH login attempts used master/wasd and root/root from an SSH-2.0-Go client. After login, the actor uploaded /home/honeypot/.16 twice, set it executable, tried to run it under sudo and directly, then removed it with rm -rf. No successful download commands, port forwards, or lateral movement were observed. The session also issued multiple “check_*_transport_done” echo commands, suggesting a scripted automation flow. Observed activity shows short-lived payload staging/execution and cleanup on the host, with no additional persistence mechanisms or post-execution commands captured.
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4 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go used root with weak passwords: 12345678, 123456789, 1234567890, 123ab ...
show more4 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go used root with weak passwords: 12345678, 123456789, 1234567890, 123abc. After login, the actor ran sudo-wrapped CPU enumeration via nproc/busybox/grep on /proc/cpuinfo and repeated “check_*_transport_done” echo markers across 51 unique commands. No downloads, dropped files, persistence, port forwards, lateral movement, or other post-exploitation actions were observed. This was a credential-guessing and system-recon attempt against SSH.
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SSH brute-force activity using SSH-2.0-Go across 29 sessions in 14 minutes. Tried many default/weak ...
show moreSSH brute-force activity using SSH-2.0-Go across 29 sessions in 14 minutes. Tried many default/weak credentials for elastic, elasticsearch, es, ftptest, ftpuser, gerrit, and git accounts with passwords including 1234, 12345, 123456, 1234567, 12345678, 123456789, elastic, elasticsearch, ftptest, ftpuser, gerrit, qwerty, and 123qwe. After access attempts, the actor ran hundreds of shell commands focused on host reconnaissance and environment checks, repeatedly invoking sudo to run nproc or read /proc/cpuinfo to enumerate CPU count. No downloads, dropped files, persistence, port forwarding, lateral movement, or other post-exploitation tooling was observed.
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Multiple SSH logins attempted with admin/letmein, ec2-user/123456, master/wasd, and root/root using ...
show moreMultiple SSH logins attempted with admin/letmein, ec2-user/123456, master/wasd, and root/root using SSH-2.0-Go and SSH-2.0-paramiko_4.0.0. After access, the actor uploaded a binary named .16 twice to /home/honeypot/.16, then repeatedly tried to execute it with sudo using the submitted passwords. They attempted chmod +x on /home/honeypot/.16 and rm -rf /home/honeypot/.16, indicating preparation for execution and cleanup. Session output also included check_08e7774d93474f3059f0012d4cfcd998_transport_done and check_71d1113fc4a663cecc44a0073b61aca1_transport_done. No other downloads, persistence changes, port forwarding, lateral movement, or additional artifacts were observed.
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SSH login used root/123 from SSH-2.0-Go over 2 sessions. Activity was limited to host reconnaissance ...
show moreSSH login used root/123 from SSH-2.0-Go over 2 sessions. Activity was limited to host reconnaissance and environment probing: PATH was reset, uname was queried, nproc/cpu count was checked with sudo, and multiple shell wrapper functions were executed that printed “check_*” markers and function/control strings. No file downloads, dropped artifacts, persistence changes, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed. No malware family or tool was identified. The session consisted of scripted command execution and system profiling only.
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Brute-force SSH login attempts from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1 using 3 credential pairs: 345gs5662d34/345 ...
show moreBrute-force SSH login attempts from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1 using 3 credential pairs: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5662d34, and root/admin@123#. After access, the actor ran commands to remove and recreate the .ssh directory and append an attacker-controlled ssh-rsa public key, indicating SSH key-based persistence setup. A second command attempted to clear immutable/append-only attributes on .ssh with chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh. No downloads, file drops, malware, port forwards, or lateral movement were observed in this session.
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SSH brute-force activity with 3 login attempts over 8 seconds using 3 credential pairs: 345gs5662d34 ...
show moreSSH brute-force activity with 3 login attempts over 8 seconds using 3 credential pairs: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5662d34, and root/Asdf@1234. SSH client identified as SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6. After access, the actor ran cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh and began echoing an ssh-rsa public key into the .ssh directory, indicating attempted SSH key setup for access. A second command attempted to remove file protections on .ssh with chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh. No downloads, dropped files, malware artifacts, lateral movement, or port forwarding were observed.
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5 SSH sessions in 4m19s from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1. Login attempts used 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, r ...
show more5 SSH sessions in 4m19s from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1. Login attempts used 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5662d34, and root/admin@123#. After access, attacker removed and recreated the .ssh directory, then attempted to set an authorized_keys entry with an ssh-rsa public key, indicating SSH key-based persistence. Another command ran chattr -ia .ssh and lockr -ia .ssh to remove immutability/attributes before modifying .ssh. No file downloads, malware drops, port forwards, or lateral movement were observed.
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Observed SSH brute force and post-login tampering. 3 sessions in 5 seconds using libssh/0.9.6. Tried ...
show moreObserved SSH brute force and post-login tampering. 3 sessions in 5 seconds using libssh/0.9.6. Tried credentials: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, elastic/3245gs5662d34, elastic/password. After login, attacker attempted to remove and recreate the SSH directory and add an SSH public key: cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx. Also ran cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh to remove immutable attributes. No downloads, files dropped, port forwarding, lateral movement, or additional recon observed.
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3 SSH sessions in 2m07s using libssh_0.11.1. Login attempts used 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34 and elast ...
show more3 SSH sessions in 2m07s using libssh_0.11.1. Login attempts used 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34 and elastic/password. After access, the actor tried to remove protection from the SSH directory with chattr -ia .ssh and lockr -ia .ssh, then deleted and recreated ~/.ssh and began writing an authorized_keys-style entry: cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx. No downloads, malware payloads, port forwards, lateral movement, or additional commands were observed.
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Two SSH login attempts from the same client (SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6) used root/3245gs5662d34 and root/ ...
show moreTwo SSH login attempts from the same client (SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6) used root/3245gs5662d34 and root/Abc_123456. After access, the actor ran commands to modify SSH persistence by deleting and recreating ~/.ssh, then echoing an ssh-rsa public key into the directory, and also attempted to disable file immutability/audit attributes with “chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh”. No downloads, malware execution, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed in this activity.
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29 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go using many weak credential attempts across backup, debian, deploy, a ...
show more29 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go using many weak credential attempts across backup, debian, deploy, and dev accounts (e.g. backup/54321, backup/backup, debian/123qwe, debian/debian123, deploy/1234567890, deploy/password, dev/123). After login, the actor ran 522 commands/462 unique commands, mostly sudo-wrapped probes and environment checks. Observed activity included repeated nproc CPU-count enumeration via sudo, indicating host profiling. No file downloads, dropped artifacts, persistence actions, port forwarding, lateral movement, or malware execution were observed in the provided activity. Repeated login guessing and post-auth reconnaissance were the only confirmed behaviors.
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Observed 2 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 using credentials rose/rose2025. Activity focused ...
show moreObserved 2 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 using credentials rose/rose2025. Activity focused on weakening SSH access controls and establishing persistence: ran cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh and started writing an ssh-rsa public key into the .ssh directory for key-based access. Second command ran cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh to remove immutable attributes and alter protections on .ssh before continuing. No downloads, malware, port forwarding, lateral movement, or additional commands were observed in this window.
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Three SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 used brute-force logins with 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, ...
show moreThree SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 used brute-force logins with 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, root/3245gs5662d34, and root/aa123456. After access, the host ran cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx... to recreate SSH access, then cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh to remove immutable flags and lock the .ssh directory. Activity focused on credential stuffing and persistence via SSH key installation/maintenance; no downloads, payload execution, lateral movement, or port forwarding were observed.
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Three SSH login attempts were observed over 6.8 seconds using SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6. Credentials trie ...
show moreThree SSH login attempts were observed over 6.8 seconds using SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6. Credentials tried: 345gs5662d34/345gs5662d34, dmdba/3245gs5662d34, and dmdba/Password123!. After access, the actor ran cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXx and cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh. Observed activity focused on modifying the ~/.ssh directory and attempting to set an authorized_keys entry, plus removing immutable/append-only attributes to enable changes. No file downloads, dropped artifacts, port forwards, lateral movement, or additional commands were observed.
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Two SSH sessions over SSH-2.0-Go using credentials admin1/123 and master/wasd. Attacker uploaded /ho ...
show moreTwo SSH sessions over SSH-2.0-Go using credentials admin1/123 and master/wasd. Attacker uploaded /home/honeypot/.16 twice, then tried to execute it, made it executable with chmod +x, and removed it with rm -rf. They attempted the same sequence via sudo using the supplied passwords. Commands also show repeated status checks with strings like check_08c7110a01b5830b4c8aae5aa5c52d71_transport_done and check_26a8137e5c37f83e583ebb54c71c4485f_transport_done. Activity was focused on payload staging, execution, privilege escalation attempts, and cleanup. No lateral movement, port forwarding, or additional downloads were observed.
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30 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go over ~14 minutes. Tried 28 root passwords, mostly weak guesses and c ...
show more30 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go over ~14 minutes. Tried 28 root passwords, mostly weak guesses and common variants: 12, 123, 1234, 12345, 123456, 1234567, 12345678, 123456789, 1234567890, 123qwe, 123qwerty, 21, 321, 4321, 54321, 654321, P4ssw0rd, P4ssword, P@ssw0rd, Passw0rd, p4ssword, p@ssw0rd, passw0rd, password, qwerty, root, root1, root12. After login, 507 commands/450 unique were run. Initial activity checked CPU count via nproc using sudo with multiple fallback paths. No file downloads, dropped artifacts, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed in the provided data.
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Two SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go used weak creds admin1/123 and master/wasd. Activity centered on dr ...
show moreTwo SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go used weak creds admin1/123 and master/wasd. Activity centered on dropping and executing /home/<user>/.16, then changing it executable and deleting it with sudo attempts using both passwords. Commands show repeated execution of the dropped file, chmod +x, and rm -rf cleanup. No lateral movement observed. Two uploads of .16 were recorded; no hashes were provided. Additional commands included status strings like check_0650d3f146d9df09f7c5209979ebdbb3_transport_done and check_09bfa6c87cce1c640f023b9588de22bc_transport_done, indicating scripted post-upload checks.
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10 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go used common root passwords: root/111111, root/123123, root/1234, roo ...
show more10 SSH sessions from SSH-2.0-Go used common root passwords: root/111111, root/123123, root/1234, root/12345, root/123456. After login, activity focused on host profiling and automation checks, starting with repeated sudo-wrapped nproc/cpuinfo queries to identify CPU count. No dropped files, downloads, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed. Commands included multiple “check_*_transport_done” echoes and other reconnaissance/validation steps. Observed actions were limited to credential guessing and system enumeration.
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SSH login brute-force from SSH-2.0-Go over 9 sessions in 14 minutes. Tried credentials: fatima/fatim ...
show moreSSH login brute-force from SSH-2.0-Go over 9 sessions in 14 minutes. Tried credentials: fatima/fatima, hadoop/hadoop, maroof/maroof, partimag/partimag, riscv/123456, riscv/riscv@123, shoaib/shoaib, vr/vr, vr/vr123. After access, the actor ran host-enumeration and hardware-discovery commands only: /bin/./uname -s -v -n -r -m, uptime -p, lspci queries for VGA and 3D controller, and nvidia-smi -q checks for Product Name and count. No downloads, file writes, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed. Behavior indicates automated reconnaissance of system and GPU presence.
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Multiple SSH logins over 9 sessions using admin/letmein, admin1/123, and master/wasd from SSH-2.0-Go ...
show moreMultiple SSH logins over 9 sessions using admin/letmein, admin1/123, and master/wasd from SSH-2.0-Go and SSH-2.0-paramiko_4.0.0 clients. Activity focused on staging and executing a dropped file named .16 in the user home directory. Commands show attempts to run /home/<user>/.16, chmod +x it, and remove it with rm -rf after execution. The same file was uploaded twice as /home/honeypot/.16. Additional commands included sudo -S with the supplied passwords, simple shell checks, and repeated transport-done markers. No lateral movement, port forwarding, or other downloads were observed.
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SSH brute-force from SSH-2.0-Go across 9 sessions using developer/1234567, 12345678, 123456789, 1234 ...
show moreSSH brute-force from SSH-2.0-Go across 9 sessions using developer/1234567, 12345678, 123456789, 1234567890, abc123, admin, dev, developer. After login, repeated sudo -S probes with the same passwords to run nproc/CPU enumeration and test sudo access. No file downloads, dropped artifacts, persistence, port forwarding, or lateral movement were observed. Post-auth activity was heavy shell probing and command echoing, including repeated check_0c0d90805e255a8cb8b84be473ce282c_transport_done markers, but no malware filename, URL, or hash evidence was observed.
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Brute-ForceSSH
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